Structural failures, while rare, serve as critical reminders of the importance of design, oversight, and adherence to safety standards in construction and building maintenance. Two high-profile incidents—the demolition of the Harmon Tower in Las Vegas and the tragic collapse of Champlain Towers South in Surfside, Florida—highlight the devastating consequences when these factors fail. From the discovery of construction defects at the Harmon Tower to the catastrophic collapse of Champlain Towers South, both cases underscore the need for rigorous engineering practices and proactive risk management throughout a building’s lifecycle.

The Harmon Tower

The Harmon Tower in Las Vegas, envisioned as a 49-story luxury highlight of the $8.5 billion CityCenter project, became a cautionary example of the risks associated with construction and oversight failures. Planned as a mixed-use structure with hotel and condominium units, the project came to a halt in 2008 when structural defects were discovered. Investigations revealed that improperly installed reinforcing steel in the concrete columns posed significant risks to the tower’s structural integrity, particularly in the event of an earthquake. Deemed economically and structurally unviable, the unfinished building was demolished in 2015.

To construct the Harmon Tower, the MGM Mirage Design Group ("MGM") retained an architectural firm and a general contractor, Perini Building Company, Inc., ("Perini") to assist in the project’s development.¹ Perini, in turn, retained Halcrow, Inc. as the architectural firm to design the Harmon’s structure; prepare drawings; and perform ongoing structural engineering services, including observations and inspections, throughout the construction of multiple structures. ² Pacific Coast Steel (PCS) and Century Steel, Inc., were subcontracted by general contractor Perini to install reinforcing steel bars (rebar) and link beams.³

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After partial construction, improper installation of rebar and link beams was discovered. As a result, construction was stopped and destructive testing revealed that rebar and link beams were in a substantially defective condition.⁴ MGM ultimately stopped construction of floors 26-48 and ceased payments to Perini and its subcontractors.⁵ After alleged defects were discovered in the Harmon, litigation between the project’s owner, general contractor, and subcontractors began.⁶ A portion of the litigation revolved around the identification of the responsible parties for the construction defects.

While the matter was eventually settled between the parties, the following summarizes claims made to the court regarding the defects.

The structural engineering firm, Halcrow, had provided detailed specifications for reinforcing steel, integral to the safety and integrity of the building.⁷ During construction, however, the contractors and subcontractors deviated from these specifications in critical areas, particularly in the reinforcement detailing and placement of steel rebar.⁸ These deviations, including unauthorized modifications such as torch-cutting of steel, were not detected in a timely manner due to a breakdown in the construction oversight and quality control processes.⁹ Perini, as the general contractor, had an obligation to monitor adherence to the design specifications, but it failed to identify and address these errors during the critical phases of construction, including the shop drawing process and early-stage fieldwork. ¹⁰

It was argued that insufficient review of shop drawings and the absence of detailed large-scale rebar placement diagrams created a series of unresolved conflicts in the design that were not identified until much later.¹¹ These issues remained undetected as construction advanced, and significant work proceeded on over 15 floors without recognizing or addressing the discrepancies.¹² When the errors were finally identified, the structural engineers conducted comprehensive assessments to evaluate the impact of the defects on the building’s overall safety and compliance with code requirements.¹³ Their findings revealed that retrofitting the structure to meet safety standards would be not only cost-prohibitive but also technically challenging.¹⁴ This conclusion ultimately led to the decision to abandon the project in its original form.

It was argued that, while the engineering team’s designs were compliant with building codes, the expectation was that strict adherence to these plans during construction would ensure the building’s structural integrity.¹⁵ The contractors and subcontractors bore the responsibility for faithfully executing these designs, and the absence of effective oversight and diligent inspection allowed critical construction errors to accumulate without being addressed.¹⁶ The failure to follow the plans precisely, coupled with inadequate oversight and communication, compounded the problems.

As the defects were discovered, litigation intensified between MGM, Perini, and the subcontractors. In particular, Perini sought to hold its subcontractor, PCS, "entirely responsible" for the defective rebar placement.¹⁷ However, this allocation of blame was complicated by the acknowledgment that Perini and its subcontractors should have caught the constructability issues earlier in the process. ¹⁸ Testimony from Perini’s executives admitted that the failure to detect these issues was a breakdown in quality control procedures.¹⁹ The dispute over responsibility further delayed resolution and complicated efforts to determine the path forward for the project. The parties ultimately settled the dispute in 2014.²⁰

Champlain Towers South Collapse

The collapse of Champlain Towers South in Surfside, Florida, on June 24, 2021, claimed 98 lives and exposed systemic issues in building maintenance, oversight, and regulation. The cause remains under investigation by local, state, and federal authorities, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which received $22 million to conduct a technical evaluation under the National Construction Safety Team Act.²¹

Preliminary reporting has cited, among several possible causes, the installation of reinforcement steel bars that exceeded the maximum allowed ratio to concrete, a weakening of bonds between the reinforcement steel and concrete, abnormally soft concrete, and unusual amounts of standing water in the area where the collapse began.²² It was also undisputed that the 136-unit building, completed in 1981, had accumulated a long record of complaints about the structural integrity of its common elements during its forty-year history.²³ In wrongful death claims filed by survivors of the victims against numerous parties, plaintiffs alleged that the condominium association had been "placed on actual notice of the deplorable conditions" and that building maintenance personnel had "personally witnessed concerning amounts of [up to two feet of ] sea water accumulating in the garage during high ocean tides."²⁴ Many of these complaints also named Morabito Consultants (Morabito) as a defendant due to structural engineering services it had provided to the Champlain Towers South Condominium Association (the Association) in 2018 and 2020.²⁵

A 2018 report by structural engineers Morabito identified significant issues, including failed waterproofing beneath the pool deck and deteriorating concrete in the building’s garage and columns.²⁶ At the time of the collapse, repair work had only recently begun, but the deterioration had progressed too far.²⁷ NIST is still investigating the cause of the collapse, with its final report scheduled to be published in 2026.²⁸ However, litigation commenced quickly after the collapse.

Litigation included multiple parties: the condominium association, engineers, and contractors facing lawsuits from survivors and victims’ families.²⁹ The claims alleged negligence in identifying and addressing the known structural deficiencies, failure to implement necessary repairs, and lack of adequate communication about the risks.³⁰ In 2022, a settlement totaling over $1 billion was reached, funded by insurers, the condominium association, and parties involved in the building’s management and maintenance.³¹

Conclusion

The construction defects of the Harmon Tower and failure of structural components of the Champlain Towers South demonstrate the critical role that quality control, effective oversight, and proper maintenance play in safeguarding public safety. In both cases, lapses in construction practices, oversight, and the failure to address known issues were all raised during investigations into the identified defects and subsequent litigation. By examining these cases, professional engineers can better understand the importance of adhering to design specifications, maintaining robust oversight, and addressing issues proactively.

¹ Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 302 P.3d 1148, 1150 (Nev. 2013).
² Id.
³ In re CityCenter Const. Litigation, 373 P.3d 903 (Nev. 2011); In re CityCenter Const. & Lien Master Litig., 310 P.3d 574, 671 (Nev. 2013).
⁴ In re CityCenter Const. Litigation, 373 P.3d 903 (Nev. 2011).
⁵ In re CityCenter Const. Litigation, 373 P.3d 903 (Nev. 2011).
⁶ In re CityCenter Const. & Lien Master Litig., 310 P.3d 574, 672 (Nev. 2013).
⁷ See In re CityCenter Const. & Lien Master Litig., Citycenter’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 2014 WL 12943502 (Aug. 11, 2014).
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²⁰ See Ken Ritter & Kimberly Pierceall, Settlement reached in lawsuit over flawed Strip hotel tower, Las Vegas Sun (Dec. 16, 2014 2:46 p.m.).
²¹ See Champlain Towers South Collapse: Background, Natl. Inst. Standards & Tech. (Apr. 5, 2022).
²² See Ben Conarck, Aaron Leibowitz & Sarah Blaskey, Feds’ Video Shows ‘Astronomical’ Corrosion, Crowded Rebar in Champlain Towers Debris, Mia. Herald (Aug. 26, 2021, 11:46 AM).
²³ See Complaint ¶ 24, Lafont v. Champlain Towers S. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 21-25137-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Cnty. Nov. 11, 2021) ("In 2001, a building resident filed a lawsuit against the Association alleging property damage caused by water entering her unit through ‘cracks in the outside wall of the building.’ The complaint alleged that the Association ‘failed to repair or negligently repaired’ the ‘common elements of the outside walls of the building.’ No action was taken.").
²⁴ Complaint 21-22, Lafont v. Champlain Towers S. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 21-25137-CA-01, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Cnty. Nov. 11, 2021).
²⁵ Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Morabito Consultants, Inc., No. CV JKB-21-1966, 2022 WL 326731 (D. Md. Feb. 3, 2022).
²⁶ Champlain Towers South Condominium, Structural Field Study Report (Oct. 8, 2018).
²⁷ Sarah Blaskey & Aaron Leibowitz, ‘Major Error’ was Flagged in 2018 Inspection Report of Collapsed Building Near Miami Beach, Mia. Herald (Jan. 25, 2022, 4:22 PM) (noting that "at the time of the collapse repairs on the roof were underway, but concrete restoration had not yet begun").
²⁸ See Champlain Towers South Collapse: September Update, Natl. Inst. Standards & Tech. (Sep. 12, 2024).
²⁹ See generally Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Morabito Consultants, Inc., No. CV JKB-21-1966, 2022 WL 326731 (D. Md. Feb. 3, 2022).
³⁰Id.
³¹ See Keith Jones, Judge Approves $1B+ Settlement for Victims of Surfside Condo Collapse, CBS News Miami (June 23, 2023, 12:59).